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I. Introduction
This Article summarizes and discusses important developments in West
Virginia oil and gas law between August 1, 2021 and July 31, 2022. Part II
of this Article will discuss developments in state statutes and regulations.
Part III will discuss common law developments in West Virginia’s state and
federal courts.
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
A. Legislative Enactments
The West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills during the 2022 regular
session that will have significant effect on the oil and gas industry: (1)
Senate Bill 694, which established a new statutory pooling process for
horizontal oil and gas wells; and (2) Senate Bill 650, which amended the
Cotenancy Modernization and Majority Protection Act.
The West Virginia Legislature enacted Senate Bill 694, codified as West
Virginia Code § 22C-9-7a, which allows oil and gas operators to unitize
property for the drilling of horizontal oil and gas wells without unanimous
consent from all oil and gas owners in the unit. The operator must have the
consent to pool the leases by 75 percent or more of executive interest
royalty holders, a term that includes all oil and gas interests for which the
owner has the right to grant an oil and gas lease, but which excludes
wellbore-only working interests, overriding royalty interests, nonparticipating royalty interests, non-executive mineral interests, and net
profits interests, in the proposed unit, and the applicant operator must have
at least 55 percent of the working interest in the unit. For royalty owners
who do not consent to unitization of their interests, the statute provides
compensation in an amount equal to the 25 percent weighted average
monetary bonus amount on a net mineral acre basis and a production
royalty percentage equal to 80 percent of the weighted average production
royalty percentage rounded to the nearest one tenth of one percent paid to
other executive interest owners of leased tracts in the unit in the same target
formation.
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Senate Bill 650 amended the Cotenancy Modernization and Majority
Protection Act1 so that a super-majority of co-tenants, namely 75 percent of
the ownership, would be permitted to develop their oil and gas interests
over the refusal of minority co-tenants to consent to such development.
Previously, the Act only applied to tracts with seven or more co-owners.
The amendment removed the seven-or-more-owners limitation and applied
the act to tracts owned by any number of co-tenants so long as all of the
other provisions of the act were satisfied.
B. Regulatory Changes
There were no relevant oil and gas regulatory changes between August 1,
2021 and July 21, 2022.
III. Judicial Developments
A. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
1. Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci
In Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci,2 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals affirmed a lower court decision that a tax deed was void because it
was based upon an invalid assessment of an oil and gas leasehold interest;
there, the oil and gas estate itself had never been severed in title from the
surface of the land, it had been properly assessed as part of a larger tract of
land, and all taxes on the land had been paid. The Court’s decision comes
against a backdrop of long-standing rules regarding the payment of real
property taxes assessed against mineral interests. Under West Virginia law,
where one person owns the surface estate in a tract of land and another
person owns a mineral estate, the assessor “shall assess such respective
estates, or any undivided interest therein, to the respective owners
thereof . . . .”3 But, in State v. Allen, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that “the State is not entitled to double taxes on the same land
under the same title” and “in case of two assessments of the same land,
under the same claim of title, for any year, one payment of taxes, under
either assessment, is all the State can require.”4
In 1906, Albert Schenk purchased 500 acres of farmland in Marshall
County, which included both the surface and oil and gas estates in the land.
1.
2.
3.
4.

W. VA. CODE §§ 37b-1-1 et seq.
246 W. Va. 26, 866 S.E.2d 91 (2021).
W. VA. CODE § 11-4-9.
State v. Allen, Syl. Pts. 1 and 2, 65 W. Va. 335, 64 S.E. 140 (1909).
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In 1919, Schenk granted an oil and gas lease for a 202-acre part of the 500acre farm (the “Leased Tract”). In 1930, Schenk died, and, in his will, he
devised the farm into a testamentary trust for the benefit of his grandson
Albert Schenk III until his grandson reached the age of 40 (the trustee later
conveyed the farm to Albert Schenk III in 1957). At some time after Mr.
Schenk’s death, the trustee along with Mr. Schenk’s estate entered into
agreements with the Natural Gas Company of West Virginia, reducing the
royalties payable on two wells on the Leased Tract, Well Nos. 629 and 630.
In 1935, the Marshall County assessor entered two assessments against Mr.
Schenk’s estate and the testamentary trust: one for the 500-acre farm (the
“Farm Assessment”), which would have included the Leased Tract, and the
other for “202 Royalty Wells #629-630 Nat Gas Co. W. Va.” (the “Well
Assessment”). In spite of the two assessments, there had been no severance
of the ownership of the oil and gas estate underlying the 500-acre farm. The
taxes assessed against both entries were paid for 1935, but the estate and the
trustee only paid the taxes against the Farm Assessment in 1936 and did not
pay the taxes against the Well Assessment that year. As a result, the taxes
against the Well Assessment were declared delinquent and were ultimately
sold to Everett Moore, who received a tax deed for the property covered by
the Well Assessment in 1949. The Well Assessment was again sold for
delinquent taxes to Orville Young, who received a tax deed for it in 1995;
this interest was later conveyed to Orville Young, LLC and Rolaco, LLC.
In the meantime, Albert Schenk III died in 1995 and devised the farm to his
wife, who, in turn, conveyed part of the farm, including part of the Leased
Tract, to her daughter Katherine Schenk Bonacci, who, by subsequent
deeds, conveyed this part of the Leased Tract to her sons Frank A. Bonacci
and Brian F. Bonacci. The Bonacci brothers filed a declaratory judgment
action to determine the ownership of the oil and gas underlying their part of
the Leased Tract. Ultimately, the circuit court granted the Bonacci brothers’
motion for summary judgment and Orville Young, LLC and Rolaco, LLC
appealed.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the
tax deeds to Moore and Young were void because both were based upon
invalid, duplicate tax assessments erroneously created by the Marshall
County assessor. The court noted that “when a single landowner owns both
the surface and the subjacent mineral estate in a parcel of property and such
mineral estate has not been severed from the surface, the property should be

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol8/iss2/25

2022]

West Virginia

499

assessed as a single, whole unit and not as separate assessments for the
surface estate and the mineral estate.”5
This decision marks the fourth time in the past five years6 that the court
has considered a case involving tax deeds arising from assessments for
either severed oil and gas estates or erroneously created assessments for
leasehold royalties entered under the oil and gas owner’s name. The
confusion created by these duplicative assessments and the resulting tax
deeds continue to be a challenge to mineral title examiners in West
Virginia.
2. SWN Prod. Co., LLC v. Kellam7
In SWN Prod. Co., LLC v. Kellam,8 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, in a 4-1 decision,9 answered a certified question from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia and
reaffirmed that Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC10 remains
good law in West Virginia; however, the court reformulated a set of three
other certified questions into one question, namely: “What level of
specificity does Tawney require of an oil and gas lease to permit the
deduction of post-production costs from a lessor’s royalty payment, and if
such deductions are permitted, what types of costs may be included?” and
then declined to answer that question because doing so “necessarily
involves the exploration of contractual language, the possible need for
interpretation of said language, and the development of facts to assist either
the court or the factfinder, as appropriate.”11

5. Orville Young, LLC, 866 S.E.2d at 98.
6. See also L&D Investments, Inc. v. Mike Ross, Inc., 241 W. Va. 46, 818 S.E.2d 872
(2018), Hill v. Lone Pine Operating Co., No. 16-0219, 2016 WL 6819787 (W. Va. Nov. 18,
2016), and Haynes v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 15-1203, 2016 WL 6542734 (W. Va. Oct. 28,
2016).
7. Disclosure: please note that the author’s law firm represented amici curiae
American Petroleum Institute, Gas and Oil Association of WV, Inc., and the West Virginia
Chamber of Commerce in this proceeding.
8. 875 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 2022).
9. Two of the Court’s five justices, Tim Armstead and Haley Bunn, recused
themselves from hearing this case. Justice Bill Wooton delivered the opinion for the Court,
joined by Chief Justice John Hutchison and two temporary justices, Family Court Judge Jara
Howard and Circuit Judge Jack Alsop. Chief Justice Hutchison filed a concurring opinion
and Justice Beth Walker filed a dissenting opinion.
10. 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006)
11. Kellam, 875 S.E.2d at 219.
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SWN Production Company, LLC and Equinor USA Onshore Properties,
Inc. own the working interest in an oil and gas lease that was first granted
by Charles and Phyllis Kellam in 2007 and have engaged in oil and gas
development pursuant to it. The Kellams’ lease contains the following
royalty provision:
4. In consideration of the premises the Lessee covenants and
agrees:
(A) To deliver to the credit of the Lessor in tanks or pipelines, as
royalty, free of cost, one-eighth (1/8) of all oil produced and
saved from the premises, or at Lessee's option to pay Lessor the
market price for such one-eighth (1/8) royalty oil at the
published rate for oil of like grade and gravity prevailing on the
dates such oil is sold into tanks or pipelines. Payment of royalty
for oil marketed during any calendar month to be on or about the
60th day after receipt of such funds by the Lessee.
(B) To pay to the Lessor, as royalty for the oil, gas, and/or
coalbed methane gas marketed and used off the premises and
produced from each well drilled thereon, the sum of one-eighth
(1/8) of the price paid to Lessee per thousand cubic feet of such
oil, gas, and/or coalbed methane gas so marketed and used,
measured in accordance with Boyle's Law for the measurement
of gas at varying pressures, on the basis of 10 ounces above
14.73 pounds atmospheric pressure, at a standard base
temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit, without allowance for
temperature and barometric variations less any charges for
transportation, dehydration and compression paid by Lessee to
deliver the oil, gas, and/or coalbed methane gas for sale.
Payment for royalty for oil, gas, and/or coalbed methane gas
marketed during any calendar month to be on or about the 60th
day after receipt of such funds by the Lessee.12
On April 28, 2020, the Kellams filed a putative class action lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
against SWN and Equinor, alleging that both companies had improperly
deducted post-production costs from royalty checks because the terms of
the royalty clause in the Kellams’ lease (and other similar leases) did not
permit such deductions since the royalty clause lacked the specific language
12. Id. at 220 (emphasis in original).
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necessary to permit such deductions, as required under Tawney. SWN and
Equinor filed answers to the Kellams’ complaint in July 2021 and then
moved for judgment on the pleadings, seeking a dismissal of the Kellams’
complaint with prejudice. On September 13, 2021, the district court, sua
sponte, certified four questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.13
Explaining its decision to re-affirm Tawney, the court noted that it had
first addressed the question of the use of post-production cost deduction in
royalty calculations in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc.,14 where it held
that such deductions can only be taken when the lease explicitly permits
them and that only reasonable expenses, actually incurred, may be
deducted, a position that is usually called the “marketable product rule,”
because “a lessee impliedly covenants that he will market oil or gas
produced,” so that “the lessee should bear the costs associated with
marketing products produced under a lease.”15 In Tawney, the court
reaffirmed Wellman’s default rule that the lessee bears the brunt of postproduction costs absent lease language shifting some of that cost to the
lessor and held that such cost-shifting language “must expressly provide
that the lessor shall bear some part of the costs incurred between the
wellhead and the point of sale, identify with particularity the specific
deductions the lessee intends to take from the lessor’s royalty (usually 1/8),
and indicate the method of calculating the amount to be deducted from the
royalty for such post-production costs.”16 As a justification for leaving
Tawney undisturbed now, the court noted that since that decision in 2006,
“thousands of oil and gas leases in this State—including the Kellams’ own
lease—were crafted with this standard in mind.”17
But also in those intervening years, Tawney came under criticism from
the court itself in Leggett v. EQT Prod. Co.,18 a case in which the court
determined that West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e), which provides that
fractional royalty payments arising from new development on older oil and
gas leases that provided for flat-rate gas well rentals, could be calculated

13. Kellam v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, Civil Action No. 5:20-cv-85, 2021 WL 4621067
(N.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2021).
14. 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001).
15. Kellam, 875 S.E.2d at 222 (quoting Wellman, 210 W. Va. at 211, 557 S.E.2d at
265).
16. Id. at 223 (quoting Tawney, 219 W. Va. at 268, 633 S.E.2d at 24).
17. Id.
18. 239 W. Va. 264, 800 S.E.2d 850 (2017).
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using a method that allocated some post-production costs to the lessor.19
While the Leggett Court determined that Tawney did not apply to the
question at hand, its opinion contained a lengthy discussion critical of
Tawney and Wellman, which the Kellam Court treated as obiter dictum and
ignored.
Nevertheless, SWN and Equinor argued that Leggett’s criticism of
Tawney and Wellman presented an opportunity to revisit whether West
Virginia law continued to recognize the implied covenant to market and the
marketable product rule. In declining to do so, the court relied in part on the
doctrine of stare decisis, but more interestingly, the court held that it did not
need to address the implied covenant to market because “in the case at
bar…that covenant is not implicated,” further noting that in the Kellams’
lease “there is a contractual provision addressing the allocation of postproduction costs such that an implied covenant is not necessary to ascertain
the parties’ intent in contracting,” and pointing to the provisions in
Paragraph 4(B) of the Kellams’ language, highlighted in the extract above,
regarding “charges for transportation, dehydration and compression paid by
Lessee to deliver the oil, gas, and/or coalbed methane for sale.”20 Since the
Kellams’ lease is not silent on the allocation of post-production costs, the
court held that the implied covenant to market is inapplicable because
“there is no gap for the implied covenant to fill.”21 Instead, the court left it
to the district court, as factfinder, to determine whether this lease provision
satisfies Tawney’s specificity requirements, declining to “create a hard and
fast rule” regarding that question.22 The court also reiterated that
requirements under Tawney and Wellman in order to allocate postproduction costs to the lessor: “the lease must: (1) include language
indicating the lessor will bear some of those costs; (2) identify with
particularity the deductions to be made (with an understanding that such
deductions must be both reasonable and actually-incurred under Wellman);
and (3) indicate the method of calculating the amount to be deducted.”23
Curiously, the court said nothing about the way in which Tawney had
been applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
19. The West Virginia Legislature amended the statute during its 2018 regular session
and effectively overruled Leggett by specifically providing that royalties calculated under
the statute would be “free from any deductions for post-production expenses.” Kellam, 875
S.E.2d at 223-24 (citing W. VA. CODE § 22-6-8(e)).
20. Id. at 226.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 227.
23. Id.
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Young v. Equinor USA Onshore Props., Inc.,24 where the federal appeals
court determined that the royalty clause of an oil and gas lease satisfied
Tawney’s requirements and permitted post-production cost deductions, but
in his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Hutchison criticized Young and its
statement that “Tawney doesn’t demand that an oil and gas lease set out an
Einsteinian proof for calculating post-production costs,” insisting that
“lessees insist on taking estimated costs or vague, malleable, impossible-tomeasure deductions from royalties – in essence, using Einsteinian methods
that are incomprehensible to all but the most clever industry accountants.”25
In her dissent, Justice Walker, the one member of the Leggett court still
sitting on the state’s highest bench, reiterated many of the points from
Leggett’s criticism of Tawney and Wellman and stated that she would have
taken this opportunity to overrule both of them.26
B. United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts
of West Virginia
1. Benson v. High Road Operating, LLC27
In Benson v. High Road Operating, LLC,28 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment
in favor of High Road Operating, LLC (formerly known as American
Petroleum Partners Operating, LLC) (“HRO”) in a dispute with a group of
landowners in Ohio County, West Virginia, over HRO’s decision to
surrender the oil and gas leases granted to it by the landowners and HRO’s
refusal to tender bonus payments to the landowners because the court
determined that the bonus payments were subject to a condition precedent,
specifically the execution and acknowledgement of the leases by HRO,
which was never satisfied.
In April and May 2018, the landowners executed the following
instruments: (1) a Paid-Up Oil and Gas Lease; (2) an Addendum to the
Lease; (3) Order of Payment – Oil & Gas Lease Bonus; and (4) a
Memorandum of Lease. While the landowners signed and acknowledged
the leases, HRO did not execute any of them; however, the landowners and
24. 982 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2020).
25. Kellam, 875 S.E.2d at 234 (C.J. Hutchison, concurring) (quoting Young, 982 F.3d at
208).
26. Id. at 235.
27. Disclosure: please note that the author’s law firm represented High Road Operating,
LLC in this case.
28. Civil Action No.: 5:20-cv-00229, 2022 WL 264548 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 27, 2022).
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HRO did execute and acknowledge the Memoranda of Lease, each of which
recited that the landowners and HRO had entered into a Lease. In May and
June 2018, HRO recorded the Memoranda in the Ohio County Clerk’s
office.
The Order of Payment required HRO to tender a bonus payment to the
landowners equal to $6,500 per net mineral acre; however, this payment
was “[o]n and subject to approval of the fully executed and notarized Oil
and Gas Lease . . . by the management of [HRO] . . . and upon and subject
to further approval of [the landowners’] title and rights thereunder by
[HRO].”29 The Order of Payment called for the bonus payment to be made
within 90 business days from the date of the Order of Payment and
provided that, if the title examination revealed that the landowners owned
less than 100 percent of the oil and gas, then the bonus payment could
either be proportionately reduced or HRO could, at its sole option, void the
Lease. The landowners executed the Order of Payment, but HRO did not
because there was no line on the Order of Payment for HRO’s execution.
HRO never tendered any bonus payments to the landowners.
Between October 5, 2018 and April 18, 2019, HRO sent each landowner
a Surrender of Oil and Gas Lease, executed by HRO, which under HRO
“release[d], relinquish[ed], surrender[ed] . . . any and all right, title, and
interest whatsoever presently owned.”30 The landowners leased their
mineral interest to another company for a $4,500/acre bonus payment and
then they filed suit against HRO in 2020, stating causes of action for breach
of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and slander of title. The landowners and HRO both filed motions for
summary judgment and the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of HRO.
The district court, applying West Virginia law, held that a breach of
contract claim has four elements: (1) the existence of a valid, enforceable
contract; (2) the plaintiff has performed under the contract; (3) the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the
contract; and (4) the plaintiff has been injured as a result. According to the
district court, the second and fourth elements were undisputed, and the
court’s decision would hinge on the first and third elements. The
landowners argued that they had formed valid, enforceable contracts with
HRO and that HRO had breached those contracts by failing to pay the
bonus, while HRO argued that there was no such contract, that even if there
29. Id. at *1.
30. Id. at *2.
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was, conditions precedent to its performance had not been satisfied, and
that any obligation owed by HRO to the landowners had been discharged
by these conditions precedent.
The district court held that there was a valid and enforceable contract
between the landowners and HRO. Under West Virginia law, a valid and
enforceable contract requires (1) competent parties, (2) legal subject matter,
(3) valuable consideration, and (4) mutual assent. HRO disputed that the
parties had mutually assented to form a contract, but the court found, by
construing the Lease, the Memorandum of Lease, and the Order of Payment
together, that HRO had manifested an intent to be bound and that the terms
of the Lease and the Order of Payment were certain enough to create a
power of acceptance on the part of the landowners. The court also rejected
HRO’s argument that the Lease and the Order of Payment represented only
preliminary negotiations between the parties, relying on a six-factor test
adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Blair v.
Dickinson31—the factors being, whether: (1) the contract is the type usually
made in writing; (2) the contract requires a formal writing for its full
expression; (3) the contract has many details or only a few; (4) the value of
the contract is large; (5) it is a common or unusual contract; and (6) the
negotiations themselves indicate a written draft is contemplated as a final
conclusion of negotiations.
But, having determined that valid and enforceable contracts existed
between the landowners and HRO, the court nonetheless held that HRO did
not breach its contractual duty because the conditions precedent to HRO’s
obligation to tender the bonus payments had not been satisfied. Specifically,
the court pointed to the language in the Order of Payment that conditioned
the bonus payment “[o]n and subject to approval of the fully executed and
notarized Oil and Gas Lease herewith (“Oil and Gas Lease”) by the
management of [HRO].”32 While the court did not try to define
“management approval,” it nevertheless held that HRO was not obligated to
tender the bonus payments because the Lease was never “fully executed
and notarized,” as HRO never executed or acknowledged the Leases.
In a later decision in the same case,33 the court dismissed with prejudice
claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
slander of title made by a group of landowners in Ohio County, West
31. 133 W. Va. 38, 54 S.E.2d 828 (1949)
32. Benson, 2022 WL 264548, at *7.
33. Benson v. High Road Operating, LLC, 2022 WL 2161507 (N.D.W. Va. June 15,
2022) (Benson II).
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Virginia against HRO. After the court dismissed the landowners’ claim for
breach of contract, HRO filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
regarding the remaining claims for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and for slander of title. The district court granted
judgment on the pleadings in favor of HRO on both counts, recognizing
that the landowners could not proceed with a claim for the implied covenant
breach after the dismissal of their breach of contract claim because West
Virginia law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach
of the implied covenant apart from the breach of contract claim, and that the
landowners had not plead specific factual allegations about special damages
sufficient to sustain a claim for slander of title. Under West Virginia law,
slander of title requires proof of “(1) publication of (2) a false statement (3)
derogatory to plaintiff’s title (4) with malice (5) causing special damages
(6) as a result of diminished value in the eyes of third parties.”34 The
landowners argued that they had suffered special damages because they
were paid a lower per-acre bonus for the leases granted to SWN than they
would have been paid for the HRO leases, but the district court pointed out
“it is unclear how the lower bonus payment reflects a diminished value in
[the landowners’] mineral interests and/or real estate” since a bonus “is not
consideration for the actual value of the property” and “is not necessarily
based on the value of the property.”35
2. Glover v. EQT Prod. Co.
In Glover v. EQT Prod. Co.,36 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia denied a motion for partial summary
judgment against an oil and gas royalty owner’s claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation on the grounds that the royalty owner had testified that
she had not read the remittance statements submitted with the royalty
payments. The fraudulent misrepresentation claim is part of a purported
class action by a group of oil and gas royalty owners who allege that their
lessees have improperly calculated royalty payments for natural gas liquids,
having “intentionally and deliberately misrepresented certain information
relating to the calculation and payment of NGL royalties on the remittance
statements in order to be able to conceal their failure to pay the royalties
required under the leases and that the plaintiffs relied upon the truth of

34. Id. at *4 (quoting TXO Prod. Co. v. Alliance Res. Corp., Syl. Pt. 3, 187 W. Va. 457,
419 S.E.2d 870 (1992)).
35. Id. at *8.
36. Civil Action No.: 5:19-cv-223, 2022 WL 740762 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 23, 2022).
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these statements and the amount of the checks to their detriment.”37 Based
upon testimony by one of the purported class representatives that she did
not read the remittance statements, the defendants moved for partial
summary judgment on her fraud claim because she could not have relied
upon statements that she did not read.
In reaching its decision to deny the defendants’ motion, the district court
noted that discovery in the case has not yet concluded and that the court
would assume the truth of the plaintiffs’ claims and focus only on the
question of whether failure to read the remittance statements is fatal to the
fraud claim. The district court decided to excuse the plaintiff’s failure to
read the remittance statements because “[a] review of the statement or
check stub would not provide her with any information that would inform
her that the statements concealed improper activity on the part of [the
lessee].”38 Relying upon two decisions made under consumer protection
laws, one by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Alig v. Quicken Loans Inc.,39 and one by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals in White v. Wyeth,40 the district court held that the logic and
rationale of these cases, namely that “where concealment, suppression or
omission is alleged, and proving reliance is an impossibility, the causal
connection between the deceptive act and the ascertainable loss is
established by presentation of facts showing that the deceptive conduct was
the proximate cause of the loss,” absolved the plaintiff from proving
reliance on the remittance statements that she had not read.41
C. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
In Kay Company, LLC v. EQT Production Co.,42 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a decision by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,43 in which the
district court refused to enforce the final judgment and final order in a class
action settlement between oil and gas companies and a class of royalty
owners so as to enjoin a mineral trespass filed in the Circuit Court of

37. Id. at *1.
38. Id. at *2.
39. 990 F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 2021), judgment vacated on other grounds, Rocket Mortg.,
LLC v. Alig, 142 S. Ct. 748, 211 L.Ed.2d 468 (2022).
40. 227 W. Va. 131, 705 S.E.2d 828 (2010).
41. Id. at *2 (internal punctuation omitted).
42. 27 F.4th 252 (4th Cir. 2022).
43. Kay Co. v. Equitable Prod. Co., 535 F. Supp. 3d 537 (S.D.W. Va. 2021).
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Wetzel County by some of the members of the royalty owner class (the
“Huey Plaintiffs”).
In 2006, a class action lawsuit was filed against EQT Production
Company and Equitable Resources, Inc. (“EQT”) in the district court,
seeking damages for (1) improper deduction of post-production expenses
from royalty payments, (2) breach of lease agreements, (3) breach of
fiduciary duty, (4) fraud, (5) violation of the West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act,44 (6) violation of the West Virginia flat-rate
royalty statute,45 and (7) punitive damages. In 2010, the district court
approved a settlement of this class action, which included a provision
releasing EQT “from future claims by Class Members from any and all
royalty claims through the settlement date of December 8, 2008.”46 The
settlement agreement defined “royalty claims” as
[t]hose claims asserted by the Plaintiff Class Representatives in
this Action, individually and as representatives of the Class,
including claims for improper royalty payments, improper
deductions, improper measurement, improper accounting for
natural gas liquids, improper sales prices, breach of lease
agreements, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, violation of the
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (W. Va.
Code § 46A-6-101, et seq.), violation of the flat rate royalty
statute (W. Va. Code § 22-6-8), and punitive damages, all based
upon the failure to pay proper royalty.47
The release was also limited to a compensation period running from
February 1, 2000 to December 8, 2008.
Class members had to submit a claim form to obtain settlement funds.
One such form, which applied to those class members subject to flat-rate
leases, provided that claimants “cannot seek forfeiture of their Flat Rate
Leases after entry of Final Order and Judgment in this civil action.”48 The
Huey Plaintiffs submitted a Flat Rate Lease claim form and received funds
from the settlement of the class action. As part of the settlement of the class
action, the district court also ordered that the class members were barred
from asserting royalty claims against EQT, that all such claims were
released through December 8, 2008, and that the settlement agreement
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provided the sole and exclusive remedy to the class members for royalty
claims.
In 2017, the Huey Plaintiffs field a civil action against EQT in the
Circuit Court of Wetzel County, alleging, among other things, mineral
trespass on the grounds that an oil and gas lease granted in 1900, the Hoge
Lease, which granted EQT the right to produce the oil and gas owned by
the Huey Plaintiffs had expired, but that EQT continued to produce oil and
gas after the expiration of the Hoge Lease. The Hoge Lease provided for a
primary term of five years and a secondary term that would continue “as
long after the commencement of operations as said premises are operated
for the production of oil or gas.”49 The Huey Plaintiffs alleged in the Wetzel
County case that, from 1935 to 2014, the Hoge Lease was being held by
production from a single oil well, but that that well did not produce in 1987,
2004, or 2005, so that the Hoge Lease had terminated by its own terms for
lack of production and that EQT had drilled additional wells on the Hoge
Lease in 2013 and 2014.
In 2020, EQT filed a motion in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia to enforce the settlement agreement
against the Huey Plaintiffs because the Huey Plaintiffs’ Wetzel County
trespass claim was actually a royalty claim that had been satisfied by the
settlement agreement and that the Huey Plaintiffs, when they had submitted
their class action claim form had represented that the Hoge Lease was a
valid lease, which would mean that the Wetzel County trespass claim was
in violation of the settlement agreement. The district court denied the
motion. It found that the Wetzel County trespass claim did not fall within
the definition of a “royalty claim” for purposes of the settlement agreement
because the trespass claim “had nothing to do with whether EQT paid
proper royalties.”50 The district court also declined to enjoin the Wetzel
County case because it did not find an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
that applied and, even if one did, the district court would not use its
discretion to enjoin the case because EQT had other remedies and an
injunction would be an extraordinary remedy.
EQT appealed and asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse the district court’s
decision for three reasons: (1) the district court failed to find that the Huey
Plaintiffs were bound by the settlement agreement; (2) the district court
erred when it found that the Wetzel County case was not a royalty claim
barred by the settlement agreement; and (3) the district court abused its
49. Id.
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discretion in not issuing an injunction against the Wetzel County case and
that it erred in finding that two exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act did
not apply.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the first argument because the district court
had addressed whether the Huey Plaintiffs had violated the settlement
agreement, so the district court must have assumed that they were bound by
the agreement. The Fourth Circuit rejected the second argument, focusing,
as the district court had, on the definition of “royalty claims” set forth in the
settlement agreement, especially the provision that such claims were “based
upon the failure to pay proper royalty.”51 The Fourth Circuit distinguished
the Wetzel County case from the class action because the trespass claim is
not based on royalty payments, but rather on alleged damage to the Huey
Plaintiffs’ property. The Fourth Circuit also noted that, even if the Wetzel
County case were a royalty claim, the settlement agreement would not bar it
because the release in the settlement agreement only applied to royalty
claims prior to December 8, 2008, and the Huey Plaintiffs’ trespass claim in
the Wetzel County case was related to an alleged trespass in 2013 and 2014,
which occurred after the period covered by the settlement agreement.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with EQT’s contention that its motion
fell within either the “in aid of jurisdiction” or “re-litigation” exceptions to
the Anti-Injunction Act. While federal law authorizes federal courts to
enjoin state court proceedings that interfere with federal judgments, such
injunction cannot be granted unless (1) expressly authorized by an Act of
Congress, (2) necessary in aid of the federal court’s jurisdiction, or (3)
necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court’s judgments, and even
then, the federal court’s decision to grant such an injunction is discretionary
on the part of the federal court. Here, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court that the Wetzel County case did not “seriously impair the
district court’s flexibility and authority to decide the class action” nor that it
represented a re-litigation of the class action because the trespass claim had
not been squarely presented for the district court’s determination.52 The
Fourth Circuit also held that, had one of the two exceptions to the AntiInjunction Act applied, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to issue the injunction sought by EQT.
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